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On the basis of a large outbreak of vancomycin-resis-
tant Enterococcus faecium in a German university hospi-
tal, we estimated costs (≈1 million Euros) that could have 
been avoided by early detection of the imminent outbreak. 
For this purpose, we demonstrate an easy-to-use statistical 
method.
R
ecently, vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium 
(VRE) has been detected with increasing frequency in 
Germany (1). Although some hospitals have reported only 
sporadic ﬁ  ndings, others have been faced with extended 
outbreaks (2–5). Apart from threatening patient health, 
these pathogens have an unfavorable economic impact on 
resources for healthcare in general. Control of VRE has 
proven to be costly and time-consuming (6). We therefore 
examined to what extent early implementation of control 
measures could have prevented these undesirable conse-
quences in an outbreak of VRE at a university hospital in 
southwestern Germany.
At this hospital ≈68,000 inpatients and 220,000 out-
patients are treated each year. In 2003, 5 VRE-colonized 
patients were identiﬁ  ed. In 2004, VRE were ﬁ  rst detected 
in April. While at most 3 cases per month were observed 
through July, 8 colonized patients were found in August 
(Figure 1, panel A). The number of colonized patients re-
mained relatively high in the following months. By the end 
of December, the cumulative number of patients with VRE 
was 48 (Figure 1, panel B). Although medical microbiolo-
gists were concerned about a possible outbreak as early as 
August, decision makers were reluctant to acknowledge a 
situation that needed action to be taken until January 2005. 
At that time, an infection control program was implement-
ed. It included VRE screening in stool and anal/rectal swab 
samples from patients exhibiting an increased risk for VRE 
carriage (2). This program resulted in a sharp increase of 
detected cases to a total of 105 patients for February and 
March 2005 (Figure 1, panel A).
Retrospectively, we examined whether comprehen-
sible proof of an imminent outbreak could have been given 
early enough to have convinced decision makers of the need 
for control measures. For early outbreak detection, we have 
chosen a simple approach that can be easily adopted by in-
fection control nurses dealing with multiresistant patho-
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Figure 1. Course of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) 
outbreak at a German university hospital and time point (arrowhead, 
30th calendar week; arrow, 31st calendar week) when outbreak alert 
could have been given. A) Number of VRE-carrying patients treated 
in a university hospital in 2004 and 2005. Given is the number of 
patients who were identiﬁ  ed for the ﬁ  rst time within a certain month 
(incident cases). In 2004 the ﬁ  rst VRE patient was discovered in 
April 2005. B) Sum of VRE-exhibiting patients (cumulative number 
of patients [incident cases]) within distinct calendar weeks in 2004 
(black line). Trend line (gray line) indicates exponential increase of 
numbers of incident cases (y = 0.002, χ2 – 0.3497 × 1.0299 [R2 = 
0.9918]).gens usually occurring only sporadically (7). It is based on 
a Poisson distribution that describes the probability of rare, 
independent events in determined frames such as equal 
time periods (8). The course of a Poisson distribution is de-
scribed by a complex formula containing several constants 
and 1 variable. This variable may be the number of VRE 
incidents that had happened in an earlier period (reference 
period). Knowing this, one can estimate the smallest num-
ber above a reference number to occur with a probability 
of p<0.05. Thus, for any small reference number, one can 
calculate a threshold number that cannot be explained by 
chance (respectively, a probability of p<0.05) and therefore 
suggests an imminent outbreak (Figure 2).
Sporadic cases of peculiar multiresistant pathogens 
at a hospital within a calendar year would be such a rare 
event. In 2003, 5 cases of VRE were observed within 1 hos-
pital; therefore, one would expect some number of cases 
close to 5 to appear in 2004 by chance. As shown in Figure 
2, if one considers 5 cases as the reference number, the oc-
currence of 10 cases would justify an outbreak alert. If one 
accounts for some underreporting in the reference period 
and assumes 7 cases as reference, 12 cases would be the 
threshold. In this example, the 10th VRE case in 2004 ap-
peared at the 30th calendar week, and the 12th case at the 
31st calendar week.
Using this method, one must be aware of some limi-
tations. Diagnostic awareness and procedures should not 
have changed within the compared periods. Furthermore, 
comparing calendar years, as shown in our example for 
ease, may lead to late alerts; we should have taken the ﬁ  rst 
30 (or 31) weeks of 2003 as a more appropriate reference 
period.
Two unusual aspects of our example deserve mention: 
First, the outbreak was caused by 2 strains (ST203, ST280) 
and not by 1 strain. While strain ST203 was found in vari-
ous departments, ST280 VRE was isolated from patients 
in 2 adjacent intensive care units (2). Apparently, this did 
not jeopardize the usefulness of the outbreak alert method 
we used. Second, other hospitals in the region also had re-
ports about clusters of VRE (5). Therefore, hygienic mea-
sures may also have been hampered by admission of some 
colonized patients from outside the hospital (9). Regardless 
of whether cases were caused by within-hospital transmis-
sion or by introduction from outside, a markedly increased 
number of cases requires attention and control measures to 
prevent further spread.
On the basis of our calculations, outbreak control mea-
sures could have been justiﬁ  ed by a comprehensible sta-
tistical method in August 2004 (30th/31st calendar week). 
Instead, the cumulative numbers of cases increased expo-
nentially and insidiously for 4 more months until the deci-
sion makers accepted the need for an infection control pro-
gram (Figure 1, panel B). Fortunately, hygienic measures 
effectively reduced the numbers of incident cases (Figure 
1, panel A). Nonetheless, the impact of dozens of cases was 
high, and it took strong efforts and several months to get 
the outbreak under control (i.e., only a few cases of VRE 
strain ST203 still prevalent in the hospital).
Complete calculation of costs compared with those 
that could have been prevented by an early outbreak alert 
is complicated and retrospectively hard to achieve. For a 
crude estimation of minimum of avoidable costs, we as-
sume that taking measures as early as August 2004 would 
have led to controlling the outbreak by January 2005. Since 
control measures in 2005 have sharply reduced the number 
of incident cases to a low level (Figure 1, panel A), admis-
sion from outside appears to play a minor role.
Therefore, we examined VRE patients identiﬁ  ed from 
February through March 2005 (n = 105). Conclusive data 
were obtained from 93 patients who were kept in isolation 
for a total of 2,631 days. In the hospital, only 2 rooms were 
available for individual patient isolation. Per isolation day, 
there would have been a loss of income of ≈615 Euros for 
unused beds due to rooms occupied for isolation measures. 
This would have added 1,618,065 Euros in a completely 
occupied hospital. However, in 2004 and also in 2005, the 
occupancy of the hospital was only ≈80%, which lowered 
the loss of income by 40%. With total occupancy, the loss 
of income would be reduced to 970,839 Euros. However, 
because total occupancy will not be achieved in practice, 
the real loss of income was some amount between 970,839 
Euros and 1,618,065 Euros. It is sufﬁ  cient to calculate the 
severe loss of income to illustrate that the economic effects 
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Figure 2. Alert threshold (p<0.05) derived from Poisson distribution; 
alert number for affected patients within an observation period 
depends on the number of patients found in a reference period. 
VRE, vancomycin-resistant enterococci.Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococci, Germany
of a large outbreak of VRE in a hospital can reach a loss of 
≈1 million Euros. In a recent analysis of a VRE outbreak in 
Australia that resulted in the colonization of 64 patients, the 
costs were calculated at 2.7 million Australian dollars (6).
From our experience, we recommend making use of 
easy-to-use statistical models to detect and prevent immi-
nent outbreaks as soon as possible. In this way, costs that 
may easily exceed 1 million Euros can be prevented.
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